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A (BRIEF) RESPONSE TO THE (MANY) CRITICS
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Randall W. Quinn'
INTRODUCTION
The extent that insider trading should be regulated under the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, although not the
most urgent issue facing the securities markets in light of the
corporate accounting scandals that came to light in 2001-2002 and
the passage of the landmark Sarbanes-Oxley Act,' remains
important.' The proper scope of insider trading regulation also
remains controversial, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's 1997
decision in United States v. O'Hagan,4 which upheld the validity of
the misappropriation theory of insider trading. Under that theory,
''a person commits fraud 'in connection with' a securities
transaction, and thereby violates [section] 10(b) [of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934] and Rule 10b-5, when he misappropriates
confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach
of a duty owed to the source of the information."'  From the
1. Assistant General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission;
Adjunct Associate Professor, Washington College of Law, American University.
The author would like to thank Michael A. Conley for his valuable comments on
an earlier draft of this Comment. The Commission requires that the following
disclaimer be included: "The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of
policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statements of any
SEC employee. This Comment expresses the author's views and does not
necessarily reflect the views of the Commission, or other members of the staff."
2. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
3. See, e.g., Debora Vrana & Walter Hamilton, Insider Trading an Issue that
Won't Go Away, L.A. TIMES, June 13, 2002, at Cl.
4. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
5. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652. The court also held that the Securities and
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perspective of law enforcement, O'Hagan was a major victory that
settled key issues with respect to enforcing anti-fraud insider
trading prohibitions. Several commentators also expressed
support for the decision.7 However, this trickle of published
support for the O'Hagan decision has been swamped by a flood of
critical articles. 8
Exchange Commission did not exceed its rulemaking authority under section
14(e) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78n(e) (1994), when it adopted Rule 14e-
3(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1998), which prohibits, in the context of tender
offers, certain trading without requiring a breach of a fiduciary duty. See
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 667-77. This Comment will not address this aspect of
O'Hagan, which has generated relatively little critical attention. See Jeff Lobb,
Note, SEC Rule 14e-3 in the Wake of United States v. O'Hagan: Proper
Prophylactic Scope and the Future of Warehousing, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv.
1853, 1854 (1999); E. Livingston B. Haskell, Note, Disclose-or-Abstain Without
Restraint: The Supreme Court Misses the Mark on Rule 14e-3 in United States v.
O'Hagan, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 199 (1998).
6. See, e.g., Carol B. Swanson, Reinventing Insider Trading: The Supreme
Court Misappropriates The Misappropriation Theory, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
1157, 1159 (1997) (quoting SEC officials).
7. See, e.g., Christopher J. Bebel, A Detailed Analysis of United States v.
O'Hagan: Onward Through The Evolution of The Federal Securities Laws, 59 LA.
L. REv. 1 (1998); Adam C. Pritchard, U.S. v. O'Hagan: Agency Law And Justice
Powell's Legacy For The Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REv. 13 (1998); Joel
Seligman, A Mature Synthesis: O'Hagan Resolves Insider Trading's Most Vexing
Problems, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1998); Elliott J. Weiss, United States v.
O'Hagan: Pragmatism Returns to the Law of Insider Trading, 23 J. CORP. L. 395
(1998). It should also be noted that twenty law professors joined an amicus brief
supporting the United States in the Supreme Court. See Brief of Amici North
American Securities Administrators, Inc. and Law Professors in Support of
Petitioner, United States v. O'Hagan, 1997 WL 86236, at *la.
8. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path
Dependent Choice Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L.
REV. 1589 (1999); David Cowan Bayne, Insider Trading: The Misappropriation
Theory Ignored: Ginsburg's O'Hagan, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1998); Mark
Dallas, Note, United States v. O'Hagan: A Failed Attempt to Protect Public
Policies Underlying the Securities Laws, 32 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1107 (1999);
Michael H. Dessent, Joe Six-pack, United States v. O'Hagan, and Private
Securities Litigation Reform: A Line Must Be Drawn, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 1137
(1998); Amy E. Fahey, Note, United States v. O'Hagan: The Supreme Court
Abandons Textualism to Adopt the Misappropriation Theory, 25 FORDHAM URB.
L. J. 507 (1998); Christopher C. Faille, Securities Fraud Prosecution: Drifting Into
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Critics have argued that the decision suffers from numerous
flaws, including: misconstruing the relevant statute'; misreading the
Supreme Court's own precedents"; lacking a coherent doctrinal
basis for prohibiting insider trading"; leaving too many unanswered
questions 2 ; creating illogical loopholes in the regulatory scheme;
and extending the reach of federal securities laws too far 3 . Some
representative statements from this body of criticism illustrate the
lack of admiration for the decision. One author wrote that the
Supreme Court "ducked, misunderstood, or mishandled virtually
every issue presented by the case."'4  Another stated that the
O'Hagan decision worked a "vast, unwitting, and wholly
Dangerous Waters, 44 FED. LAW. 24 (1997); Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading
on Confidential Information-a Breach in Search of a Duty, 20 CARDOZO L.
REV. 83 (1998); James L. Kelly, Note, The Unpredictable Net: United States v.
O'Hagan: The Misappropriation Theory Upsets Investor Confidence By Catching
More Than the Plain Statutory Language and Established Precedent, 49
SYRACUSE L. REv. 1067 (1999); Janet E. Kerr & Tor S. Sweeney, Look Who's
Talking: Defining the Scope of the Misappropriation Theory After United States
v. O'Hagan, 51 OKLA. L. REv. 53 (1998); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fiduciaries,
Misappropriators and the Murky Outlines of the Den of Thieves: A Conceptual
Continuum for Analyzing United States v. O'Hagan, 33 TULSA L.J. 163 (1997);
Michael J.T. Mcnally, Comment, United States v. O'Hagan: The "Classic" Misuse
of the "Misappropriation" Theory, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 495 (1999); Donna M. Nagy, Refraining the Misappropriation
Theory of Insider Trading Liability: A Post-O'Hagan Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J.
1223 (1998); Richard W. Painter et al., Don't Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After
United States v. O'Hagan, 84 VA. L. REv. 153 (1998); Saikrishna Prakash, Our
Dysfunctional Insider Trading Regime, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1491 (1999); Larry E.
Ribstein, Federalism and Insider Trading, 6 S. CT. ECON. REv. 123 (1998); Bryan
S. Schultz, Casenote, Feigning Fidelity to Section 10(b): Insider Trading Liability
After United States v. O'Hagan, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1411 (1998); J. Dormer
Stephen III, United States v. O'Hagan: The Misappropriation Theory Under
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5-Can The Judicial Oak Grow Any Higher, 102
DICK. L. REv. 277 (1998); Swanson, supra note 6.
9. Dallas, supra note 8.
10. Bainbridge, supra note 8; see also Fahey, supra note 8.
11. Fahey, supra note 8.
12. Dessent, supra note 8.
13. Fahey, supra note 8; see also Kelly, supra note 8.
14. Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 1591.
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unwarranted expansion of Rule 10b-5"; 5 while yet another held
the view that the misappropriation theory is "foolish in
enforcement and absurd in private actions... [and] underestimates
the problems with the Court's acceptance of the theory.
16
I do not share this assessment of O'Hagan. The Supreme
Court's adoption of the misappropriation theory is consistent with
the statute and relevant precedent, rests on a reasonable policy
foundation, does not leave open too many unanswered questions
or create significant loopholes in the regulatory scheme, and does
not extend the reach of the federal securities laws too far. In sum,
O'Hagan's critics have overstated their case. The purpose of this
comment is to restore balance to the commentary on O'Hagan.
Part 1 of this Comment presents a brief overview of the
development of the misappropriation theory of insider trading
prior to O'Hagan; Part 2 summarizes the O'Hagan litigation; Part 3
responds to a number of arguments advanced by O'Hagan's critics,
focusing on three themes: the alleged lack of a coherent doctrine
supporting the misappropriation theory; the questions left open by
the decision, and the asserted loopholes created by the Court. 7
I. HISTORY OF THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY OF INSIDER
TRADING PRIOR TO O'HAGAN
"Theories" of insider trading exist because insider trading is
not expressly prohibited in the securities statutes, except in the
limited context of section 16(b) of the Exchange Act. Section
16(b), which is not an antifraud provision, generally requires
corporate officers, directors, and 10% owners to give back to the
corporation any profits made (or losses avoided) on trading in that
15. Prakash, supra note 8, at 1496.
16. Ribstein, supra note 8, at 141 (quoting ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D.
LOWENFELS, BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES
FRAUD 7:241-242 (1994)).
17. This Comment does not attempt to cite, much less discuss, every article
addressing the O'Hagan decision. Rather, I have selected and grouped criticisms
of O'Hagan thematically, with illustrations drawn from representative articles.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988).
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company's securities within any six-month period.' 9 Proof that the
person trading engaged in deception or was aware of any material
non-public information is not required." The argument has been
made, but never accepted by any court, that section 16 should be
the exclusive means of addressing insider trading.2
Two theories have been used to prosecute insider trading
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: the classical or traditional
theory, and the misappropriation theory.22 Under the classical
theory, a corporate insider violates section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by
"trad[ing] in the securities of his corporation on the basis of
material, non-public information."'  In so doing, the insider
breaches a duty of trust owed to the corporation's shareholders.24
The misappropriation theory, in contrast, applies when a person
"misappropriates confidential information for securities trading
purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the
information." '
The misappropriation theory was first advanced by the
government in a criminal case brought against Vincent Chiarella.26
Chiarella worked at a financial printing firm, preparing documents
used in corporate takeover bids." The identities of the acquiring
and target companies were concealed from the printer until the
19. See id.; see also Steve Thel, The Genius of Section 16: Regulating the
Management of Publicly Held Companies, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 391, 452-94 (1991).
20. See Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582,
585 (1973) (noting that section 16(b) imposes strict liability upon all transactions
occurring within the statutory time period, "without proof of actual abuse or
insider information, and without proof of intent to profit on the basis of such
information.").
21. Stephen, supra note 8, at 314 ("Although the Exchange Act was enacted
by Congress, inter alia, to proscribe insider trading activities, section 16 of the
Exchange Act, not section 10(b), was the vehicle intended to achieve such
means.").
22. See generally, WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER
TRADING 281-390 (Little, Brown and Company 1996).
23. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
27. Id. at 224.
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night of the final printing of the documents." Chiarella figured out
the companies' identities from other information contained in the
documents, and used the information to purchase securities of the
target companies.2 9
Chiarella was tried by a jury and convicted." On appeal, the
Second Circuit affirmed the convictions, holding that "anyone-
corporate insider or not-who regularly receives material nonpublic
information may not use that information to trade in securities
without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose."3'
The Supreme Court reversed and held, relying on common law
principles, that "there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak" and
that "a duty to disclose under 10(b) does not arise from the mere
possession of nonpublic market information."32  The Court also
stated that the requisite duty must arise from "a relationship of
trust and confidence between parties to a transaction."33
Chiarella was not, however, a total loss for the government.
The Court, in dicta, accepted the classical theory of insider
trading. 4  Further, the Court left open the validity of the
misappropriation theory, holding only that, because the theory was
not presented to the jury, it could not be a basis for affirming the
conviction.35 Four justices, in concurring and dissenting opinions,
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 225.
31. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978).
32. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235. The Court's use of common law principles
to confine the scope of the federal securities laws is questionable. See, e.g., Ray J.
Grzebielski, Friends, Family, Fiduciaries: Personal Relationships As a Basis for
Insider Trading Violations, 51 CATH. U. L. REv. 467, 472 (2002) ("Since the
federal securities laws were primarily aimed at regulating national trading
markets in securities, where those laws were intended to fill shortcomings in state
securities and common law, the Court should have considered the securities
market context to determine which uses of material, nonpublic information
would have been improper.... ").
33. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230.
34. See id. at 222 ("[T]hat the relationship between a corporate insider and
the stockholders of his corporation gives rise to a disclosure obligation is not a
novel twist of the law.").
35. See id. at 236.
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indicated approval of some type of misappropriation theory of
liability, although they didnot all agree on the proper scope of the
theory.36
The government had two responses to the Supreme Court's
insistence that insider trading liability under section 10(b) requires
breach of a fiduciary or similar duty of trust and confidence. First,
pursuant to its authority under section 14(e) of the Exchange Act
to "define, and prescribe means to prevent," fraudulent practices in
connection with a tender offer, the SEC promulgated Rule 14e-3.37
Rule 14e-3 prohibits trading securities while in possession of
material non-public information acquired from either a bidder or a
target company if substantial steps have been taken to commence
the offer.38 Breach of a duty is not required.
Second, the government brought cases pursuant to the
misappropriation theory. The government asserted that if insider
trading liability required a fiduciary or similar duty, such a duty
could be found in the relationship between the misappropriator of
information and the source or owner of the information.
The misappropriation theory was tested in court shortly after
Chiarella in United States v. Newman. 9  Newman involved
employees of an investment banking firm that advised companies
with respect to proposed mergers and acquisitions.'  The
defendants misappropriated confidential information entrusted to
their employer and conveyed it to securities traders who purchased
stock, then shared the profits from the stock's sale with the
defendants.' The employees owed no duty to the target company
or its shareholders and thus could not be prosecuted under the
classical theory of insider trading. On appeal, the Second Circuit
affirmed defendants' convictions. 2 The court stated that "in other
36. See id. at 237-52.
37. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e (1998).
38. See id. § 240.14e-3; see also SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2000).
39. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), affd, 722 F.2d 729
(2d Cir. 1983).
40. Id. at 15.
41. Id.
42. SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding the
misappropriation theory after Newman in a case brought by the SEC, the Second
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areas of the law, deceitful misappropriation of confidential
information by a fiduciary.., has consistently been held to be
unlawful .... Congress [did not intend] a less rigorous code of
conduct under the Securities Acts." ,3
Following the theory's acceptance by the Second Circuit, two
other circuits expressly adopted the misappropriation theory. In
SEC v. Clark, the defendant, a senior executive of a bidder,
learned of his employer's plan to make an acquisition." Clark used
this information to buy shares of the target. The Ninth Circuit held
that the "peculiar blend of legislative, administrative, and judicial
history" surrounding section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 provides
"strong evidence that the misappropriation theory is compatible
with the broad language of those provisions." 5
Clark represented a straightforward application of the
principles set forth in the Second Circuit cases that first adopted
the misappropriation theory.'  SEC v. Cherif,47 in which the
Seventh Circuit followed suit in accepting the theory, presented
somewhat unusual facts. After Cherif lost his job at First National
Bank of Chicago, he kept an ID card used by employees to gain
access to the building.4 In order for his card to remain active,
Cherif forged a memorandum that falsely stated that he was
continuing to work part-time at the bank on special projects.49
Using his card to get into the bank at night and on weekends,
Cherif stole information from the bank's Specialized Finance
Department, which provided financing for extraordinary business
transactions, and used the information to trade securities." In
effect, Cherif impersonated a current employee to gain access to
Circuit believed that Materia presented the same fact pattern as Chiarella).
43. Newman, 664 F.2d at 18. But see United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551,
567 (2d Cir. 1990) (sitting en banc, the Second Circuit affirmed its prior
acceptance of the misappropriation theory, but noted that the court would "tread
cautiously in extending the misappropriation theory to new relationships.").
44. SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990).
45. Id. at 453.
46. Id. (describing the facts as a "garden-variety misappropriation case").
47. SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991).
48. Id. at 406.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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material, non-public information.
The Seventh Circuit, agreeing with prior decisions upholding
the validity of the misappropriation theory, held that Cherif's
conduct fell within the scope of the theory, stating that Cherif was
not a "mere thief," but rather his actions "were fraudulent in the
common understanding of the word because they deprived some
person of something of value by 'trick, deceit, chicane or
overreaching.' 5
In addition to three circuits expressly accepting the
misappropriation theory,52 Congress on two occasions indicated its
approval of the misappropriation theory. In 1984, Congress
increased sanctions for insider trading. 3  The House report
accompanying the legislation cited with approval court decisions
upholding the misappropriation theory, and stated: "in other areas
of the law, deceitful misappropriation of confidential information
by a fiduciary... has consistently been held to be unlawful, [and
Congress] has not sanctioned a less rigorous code of conduct under
the federal securities laws.
5 4
In 1988, Congress further increased sanctions for insider
trading. In so doing, Congress declared: "[T]he rules and
regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission...
governing trading while in possession of material nonpublic
information are, as required by such Act, necessary and
appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of
investors."56  In addition, the House Report accompanying the
51. Id. at 412 (citations omitted).
52. The Third Circuit arguably accepted the misappropriation theory in
Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1985). The issue was not squarely
addressed, but on the facts as described by the court it appears that insider
trading liability was based on the misappropriation theory. See Rothberg, 771
F.2d at 822 (citing United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981) with
approval).
53. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264.
54. H.R. Rep. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1983).
55. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677.
56. See Steve Thel, Statutory Findings and Insider Trading Regulation, 50
VAND. L. REv. 1091, 1134 (1997) (arguing that "this Congressional finding
appears extremely well-constructed to establish the validity of the
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legislation stated that the misappropriation theory "fulfills
appropriate regulatory obj ectives in determining when
communicating or trading while in possession of material
nonpublic information is unlawful."57
Carpenter v. U.S. involved a scheme by a reporter for the Wall
Street Journal, who was one of the writers of the Journal's Heard
on the Street column, to profit from his advanced knowledge of the
contents of the column by tipping brokers who traded based on
their (correct) expectation that the information in the column
would have an impact on the price of securities.58 The Second
Circuit affirmed the lower court's securities fraud convictions
based on the misappropriation theory, as well as convictions for
mail fraud. 9
The misappropriation theory reached the Supreme Court in
1988, and insider trading law might have taken a different course if
the Supreme Court had not been lacking one justice when it
decided Carpenter v. United States.6 With respect to the securities
fraud convictions, the Supreme Court split 4-4, leaving the court of
appeals' decision intact.61 However, the Court affirmed, by a vote
of 8-0, the mail fraud convictions. The mail fraud statute requires
deception, but not fraud "in connection with" the purchase or sale
of securities." The Court held there was deception because the
reporter "continued in the employ of the Journal, appropriating its
confidential business information for his own use, all the while
pretending to perform his duty of safeguarding it."63  Thus, the
Court made clear the validity of a key component of the
misappropriation theory-stealing information from one's
misappropriation doctrine .... ").
57. H.R. Rep. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27 (1988).
58. Id. at 22-23.
59. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986).
60. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
61. Id. The Court had a vacancy because of the departure of Justice Powell.
See Pritchard, supra note 7, at 16 (arguing that "[h]ad Powell remained on the
court for another term, the misappropriation theory almost certainly would have
been overturned in 1987.").
62. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982); see also Post v. United States, 407 F.2d 319,
329 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
63. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 23.
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employer might, under certain circumstances, constitute deception.
In sum, in early 1995, the Second, Seventh, and Ninth circuits
expressly adopted the misappropriation theory, no court rejected
the theory, and Congress indicated its approval of the theory. This
consensus was shattered by the Fourth Circuit's surprising decision
in United States v. Bryan.' Bryan, at a time when he directed the
West Virginia lottery, bought securities in a company that he knew
was going to be awarded a gaming contract because he had rigged
the bidding.65 Bryan was convicted of mail and securities fraud.66
On appeal, Bryan made only a passing challenge to the
application of the misappropriation theory to his conduct. In a
remarkable display of judicial activism, the Fourth Circuit, in a
lengthy opinion addressing numerous arguments that were never
made by any of the parties in the case, held that the
misappropriation theory was invalid. The court of appeals based
its holding primarily on two grounds. First, the court held that "by
its own terms, the misappropriation theory does not even require
deception, but rather allows the imposition of liability upon the
mere breach of a fiduciary relationship or similar relationship of
64. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
65. Id. at 938-39.
66. Id. at 936.
67. See Richard H. Walker & David M. Levine, The Limits of Central Bank's
Textualist Approach-Attempts to Overdraw the Bank Prove Unsuccessful, 26
HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 16 n.89 (1997) (noting that "of the more than [eighty] pages
of text constituting Bryan's opening and reply briefs, only four buried sentences
challenged the validity of the misappropriation theory.").
68. See id. (indicating that Bryan argued only that the misappropriation
theory was void for vagueness). Bryan is also noteworthy for its strident tone.
For example, the court ridicules the development of the law in the Second Circuit
specifically stating that: "We regard the somewhat harrowing evolution of the
misappropriation theory as almost a testament to the theory's invalidity." Bryan,
58 F.3d at 953. The court also castigates the SEC, which was not a party and
played no role in bringing the criminal prosecution against Bryan by specifically
stating that: "Absent clearly defined rules, investors find themselves the targets
of ad hoc decision-making or pawns in an overall litigation strategy known only
to the SEC." Id. at 951. The Bryan opinion reads like a brief written by a lawyer
outraged that the government brought an action against his or her client, rather
than a judicial opinion.
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trust and confidence."69 Second, the court held that deception,
even if present, was not in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities, because the defendant must deceive a "purchaser or
seller, or... a person in some way connected with or having a
stake in an actual or proposed purchase or sale of securities ... ""
The government did not seek Supreme Court review in Bryan,
leaving the new circuit split on the validity of the misappropriation
theory to await future resolution.
II. THE O'HAGAN LITIGATION
The O'Hagan litigation has been described in detail elsewhere
and need only be summarized briefly here.' James O'Hagan was a
partner at the Minnesota law firm of Dorsey & Whitney." Prior to
the events giving rise to his prosecution for securities fraud,
O'Hagan had embezzled funds from clients that he needed to
repay. " O'Hagan used his position at Dorsey & Whitney to learn
that Grand Metropolitan PLC, a Dorsey &Whitney client, was
contemplating a tender offer for Pillsbury. 4 O'Hagan bought
Pillsbury stock and call options, becoming the largest individual
holder of Pillsbury call options in the world.75 When the proposed
tender offer was publicly announced, O'Hagan cashed in his
positions and made a profit of $4.3 million.76
O'Hagan did not fare well at trial. After conviction on all
counts of an indictment charging securities fraud under both Rule
10b-5 and Rule 14e-3, mail fraud, and money laundering, O'Hagan
was sentenced to 41 months in prison.' Subsequent to his
sentencing, however, O'Hagan's luck seemed to turn. While his
appeal to the Eighth Circuit was pending, and before the oral
69. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 949.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Bebel, supra note 7, at 3-31.
72. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997).
73. Id. at 648. O'Hagan was convicted of state fraud charges. Id. at 648 n.2.
74. Id. at 648.
75. Id. at 647.
76. Id. at 648.
77. Id. at 647.
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argument, the Fourth Circuit decided Bryan. The Eighth Circuit,
adopting in full the reasoning of Bryan, held that the
misappropriation theory was invalid."8
O'Hagan's victory, however, was not permanent. The
government sought, and obtained, Supreme Court review. The
Court upheld the validity of the misappropriation theory, holding
that "a person commits fraud 'in connection with' a securities
transaction, and thereby violates section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
when he misappropriates confidential information for securities
trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the
information."79  The Supreme Court rejected the two main
premises of the Eighth Circuit's opinion, which, as noted, were the
same arguments made by the Fourth Circuit in Bryan." First, the
Court held that there was deception because "a fiduciary who
[pretends] loyalty to the principal while secretly converting the
principal's information for personal gain.., dupes or defrauds the
principal."'" Second, regarding the "in connection with"
requirement, the Court held that the fraud in a misappropriation
case is "in connection with the purchase or sale of [a] security
because the fiduciary's fraud is consummated, not when the
fiduciary gains the confidential information, but when, without
disclosure to his principal, he uses the information to purchase or
sell securities."82  The Court also reversed the Eighth Circuit's
78. United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 620 (8th Cir. 1996) (adopting
Bryan's "analysis in its entirety as our own"). The Eighth Circuit also reversed
O'Hagan's convictions for violating Rule 14e-3, holding that "the SEC exceeded
its rulemaking authority under section 14(e) when it promulgated Rule 14e-3(a)
without including a requirement of a breach of a fiduciary obligation." Id. at 627.
This was not an issue in Bryan, which did not involve a tender offer. See supra
notes 65 & 66 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court held in O'Hagan that
the SEC did not exceed its authority. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642. The Eighth
Circuit also reversed O'Hagan's convictions for mail fraud and for money
laundering. See O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 628-29. The Supreme Court reversed as to
mail fraud. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 678 n.24. The government did not seek review
of the reversal of O'Hagan's money laundering conviction.
79. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 642, 652.
80. See supra text accompanying note 78.
81. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653.
82. Id. at 653-54. Justice Scalia, dissenting, stated that "[w]hile the Court's
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holding that Rule 14e-3 was invalid, 3 and remanded the case to the
Eighth Circuit to address other challenges raised by O'Hagan to
his convictions.84
III. A RESPONSE TO O'HAGAN'S CRITICS
As noted in the introduction to this Comment, critics have
pointed to numerous perceived flaws in the Supreme Court's
O'Hagan decision. It is impossible to address in detail all or even
most of the critical articles, many of which develop their points
skillfully and at length. Rather, this part of the Comment will
respond to the main themes in the commentary. First, the
Comment will discuss criticisms of the court's technical legal
analysis. Then, it will turn to an examination of three broader
themes advanced by O'Hagan's critics: the Supreme Court did not
set forth a coherent doctrine in support of the misappropriation
theory; the Court's decision leaves substantial questions
unanswered; and the decision creates significant loopholes for the
future regulation of insider trading." Finally, this comment will
address arguments that the decision extends federal law too far.
explanation of the scope of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 would be entirely
reasonable in some other context, it does not seem to accord with the principle of
lenity we apply to criminal statutes." Id. at 679. Justice Thomas, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, dissented on the ground that, although the undisclosed
misappropriation of confidential information involves "deception," the deception
in a misappropriation case is not "in connection with" a securities transaction. Id.
at 681-82.
83. The Court upheld the Rule on the basis of the Commission's authority to
adopt "means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent trading on material,
nonpublic information in the tender offer context." Id. at 676. The Court held
that "insofar as it serves to prevent the type of misappropriation charged against
O'Hagan, Rule 14e-3(a) is a proper exercise of the Commission's prophylactic
power under 14(e)." Id.
84. On remand, the Eighth Circuit rejected O'Hagan's other challenges to his
convictions. United States v. O'Hagan, 139 F.3d 641 (8th Cir. 1998).
85. Some overlap exists between these two topics. When exactly does an
unanswered question- creating uncertainty as to whether conduct is
prohibited -become a loophole- allowing conduct to escape prosecution even
though it is the sort of thing the statute should cover?
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1. Statutory Language and Precedent
Both before and after O'Hagan, commentators have argued
that the misappropriation theory is contrary to the plain language
of section 10(b), which requires a "deceptive device" used "in
connection with" the purchase or sale of securities.' I do not find
this a serious objection to the misappropriation theory. The
conduct prohibited by the theory easily fits within the plain
meaning of "deception" as well as "in connection with." Liability
under the misappropriation theory exists only where there is an
undisclosed breach of duty to the source or owner of the
information. Remaining silent in the face of a duty to speak is
deceptive.87 Further, obtaining information about the value of
securities by means of deception and then trading those securities
is conduct "connected" to the purchase or-sale of securities.88
Several commentators argue that O'Hagan is inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe Industries v. Green.89
Santa Fe involved a short-form merger that minority shareholders,
who received full disclosure about the transaction, alleged was
unfair.' The minority shareholders did not pursue appraisal rights
available to them under state law, but instead brought an action
alleging violation of Rule 10b-5.91 The Court observed that "the
86. See, e.g., Michael P. Kenny & Teresa D. Thebaut, Misguided Statutory
Construction to Cover the Corporate Universe: The Misappropriation Theory of
Section 10(b), 59 ALB. L. REv. 139, 211 (1995) ("The misappropriation theory
goes wrong because it is untethered to the words of the statute. Free of textual
constraint, the theory has been applied to conduct that cannot credibly be
considered fraud, much less fraud in a securities transaction."); Fahey, supra note
8, at 539 ("The [Supreme] Court improperly extended liability under section
10(b) to reach a culpable defendant whose conduct was not covered by the
language of the statute or the rule.")
87. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
88. See SEC v. Zandford, 122 S. Ct. 1899 (2002).
89. Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). See also Bainbridge,
supra note 8, at 1643 (stating that the Court ignored the "serious federalism
concerns that drove Santa Fe."); Stephen, supra note 8, at 316 ("[T]he
misappropriation theory contradicts the Court's holding in Santa Fe.").
90. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 466-67.
91. Id.
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complaint failed to alleged a material misrepresentation or
material failure to disclose," and held that "the transaction, if
carried out as alleged in the complaint, was neither deceptive nor
manipulative and therefore did not violate either section 10(b) of
the Act or Rule 10b-5."92 The Court also stated, as additional
support for its holding, that allowing a suit under Rule 10b-5 could
open the door to "bringing within the Rule a wide range of
corporate conduct traditionally left to state regulation."93
Professors Painter, Krawiec, and Willams argue that, prior to
O'Hagan, "the most significant obstacle believed to stand in the
way of the misappropriation theory" was "the Court's
interpretation of section 10(b) in Santa Fe."94  They argue that
O'Hagan:
[C]ontradicts the interpretation of [section] 10(b) underlying
the Court's holding in Santa Fe on three separate grounds: 1)
Breach of fiduciary duty, not deception, lies at the heart of the
theory; 2) The "deception" required to implicate the theory is
entirely different from the "deception" described in Santa Fe;
and 3) Misappropriation under the theory has nothing to do
with the securities transaction, and thus the "deception"
required by Santa Fe, to the extent it exists at all, is not "in
connection with" the purchase or sale of a security.95
None of these points presents a contradiction between
O'Hagan and Santa Fe. First, whether or not breach of fiduciary
duty is the "heart" of the misappropriation theory, the theory
requires deception. The theory is thus fully consistent with Santa
Fe's holding that deceptive or manipulative conduct is an element
of a violation of section 10(b). Painter, Krawiec, and Williams
argue that "although Santa Fe specifically addressed only the
Court's reluctance to merge state corporation law into federal
securities law, the Court's reasoning applies to federalization of
92. Id. at 474.
93. Id. at 478.
94. Painter et al., supra note 8, at 174 (citing Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider Trading
Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1189 (1995)).
95. Id. at 175.
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other state law fiduciary duty standards as well .... "96 However,
Santa Fe's concern was that federal law might displace state law,
leading to "established state policies of corporate regulation
be[ing] overridden."'  I am not aware of any state policy allowing
trading on information obtained by breaching a duty to the source
of the information that would be "overridden" by adoption of the
misappropriation theory.9"
Painter, Krawiec, and Williams's second and third
"contradiction" are derived from one point: the deception at issue
in a misappropriation case is not deception about the value of
securities, but goes to the way that a person obtains information-
by breaching a duty to the source of the information. Painter,
Krawiec, and Williams may believe that O'Hagan erred in refusing
to adopt a restrictive reading of "in connection with," but the
meaning of "in connection with" was not an issue implicated by the
facts of Santa Fe or addressed by the Court. It is a stretch to
contend that this concern underlies the interpretation of section
10(b) at issue in Santa Fe.99
In sum, Painter, Krawiec, and Williams's argument seeks to
extend the holding and reasoning of Santa Fe well beyond the
issues decided in that case. Nothing in Santa Fe compels rejection
of the misappropriation theory."
96. Id. at 176.
97. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 479.
98. Id. at 479. Further, although Painter, Krawiec, and Williams don't
question the validity of the classical theory of insider trading, under their view,
that theory would be equally at odds with Santa Fe. The duty supporting liability
under the classical theory-between corporate insiders and the company's
shareholders-derives from state law. Thus the classical theory should be suspect
because it "federalizes" a state law duty.
99. The Supreme Court recently rejected a narrow interpretation of the "in
connection with" requirement. See SEC v. Zandford, 122 S. Ct. 1899, 1903 (2002)
("In its role enforcing the Act, the SEC has consistently adopted a broad reading
of the phrase 'in connection with' the purchase or sale of any security." This
interpretation of the ambiguous text of section 10(b), in the context of formal
adjudication, is entitled to deference if it is reasonable [citation omitted]. For the
reasons set forth below, we think it is.").
100. Nor is O'Hagan inconsistent with the court's prior decisions in Dirks v.
SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) and Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of
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2. O'Hagan's Doctrinal Basis for Prohibiting Insider Trading
Substantial dissatisfaction exists among commentators with
respect to the Court's rationale, or asserted lack thereof, for
holding that the misappropriation theory is a valid basis of liability
for securities fraud. Several of these criticisms are addressed
below.
Professor Ribstein argues that the O'Hagan decision "makes
sense only if federal law should protect property rights in
information. State law, however, offers better-developed legal
rules regarding property rights."'' I disagree with Ribstein's
premise that the only rationale for the misappropriation theory is
protecting property rights in information. I will not confront this
much-debated issue at any length here, but to summarize some of
the other plausible rationales advanced for prohibiting insider
trading:
-insider trading makes public securities markets inefficient;"°
-insider trading has a negative effect on investor confidence,
diminishing capital formation; 3 and
Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994), as some have argued. See, e.g., Stephen, supra note
8, at 318-20. Dirks did not involve deceitful misappropriation of information.
See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 665. Central Bank did not address the issue decided in
O'Hagan-what conduct violates section 10(b)-but rather the question of does
a private right of action exist against someone alleged to have aided and abetted
a violation of section 10(b). Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191.
101. Ribstein, supra note 8, at 123; see also United States v. Chestman, 947
F.2d 551, 577 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (Winter, J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (a "policy rationale for prohibiting insider trading" is
protecting "the property rights of a corporation in information"); Bainbridge,
supra note 8, at 1644 ("Protection of the source of the information's property
rights therein is the strongest justification for a continued prohibition of insider
trading.").
102. See, e.g., Karmel, supra note 8, at 110-11.
A substantial body of academic literature argu[es] that insider trading makes
the public securities market inefficient .... First, allowing such trading would
encourage insiders to manipulate corporate decision-making and withhold
information from the market. Also, permitting insider trading would
discourage research and analysis because the public information available to an
analyst would not reflect all of the facts upon which trading is occurring.
Id.
103. See Pritchard, supra note 7, at 48 ("[Tlhe misappropriation theory
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-insider trading is morally wrong."
In any event, even granting Ribstein's premise, and assuming
that states have "better developed rules" regarding property rights,
pragmatic concerns counsel against his proposal to leave this issue
to the states. It is unlikely that states have the resources to
investigate and prosecute major insider trading cases, which often
involve conduct that crosses state boundaries."5 Even more
protects more than just property rights in valuable information. It also protects
the integrity of the stock markets and public confidence in those markets.");
Weiss, supra note 7, at 434 (stating that a "substantial body of economic
literature" supports the claim that "rational investors, if they fear that other
participants in securities markets have access to superior information, will react
by reducing the amount of capital they commit to investments in securities or the
price they pay for any given security, which will increase corporations' capital
cost."). It is difficult, if not impossible, to prove whether or not investors, in any
significant number, would stay out of the market if the misappropriation theory
had been held invalid. But let us suppose the Court had decided O'Hagan the
other way. One can imagine press coverage along these lines: "The Supreme
Court holds that insider trading laws do not prohibit stealing secret information
about corporate takeovers and trading in the target company's stock." It is
possible that some investors would react negatively to such a decision. (I am not
claiming that the Court's interpretation of the insider trading prohibitions would
outweigh, in any given case, other factors influencing investment decisions.
Indeed, during the peak of the last bull market, investors probably would not
have been much deterred if the press reported that "the Supreme Court
encourages everyone to try to obtain non-public information by fraud and use the
information to profit by trading securities.")
104. See Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider
Trading, 78 TEX. L. REv. 375, 380, 386 (defending, on moral grounds, the result
in O'Hagan, but criticizing the Court's rationale); see also Ian B. Lee, Fairness
and Insider Trading, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 119, 191 (2002) ("[A] fair
market-a system of cooperative exchange between parties respectful of one
another's autonomy-is one in which the parties do not withhold information
relevant to their trading partners' decision."); Kim Lane Scheppele, "It's Just Not
Right": The Ethics of Insider Trading, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123, 125
(1993) (advocating an "alternative theory of the ethics of insider trading, based
on a contractarian framework that focuses on the problem of unequal access to
information in securities transactions.").
105. Ribstein states that "even as to misappropriation and other conduct for
which there is no federal remedy [under his proposed regime], there is no reason
why the SEC could not continue to perform its market surveillance function" and
turn over the results of its investigation to state regulators. See Ribstein, supra
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difficult for states to investigate and prosecute would be cases
where illegal conduct takes place outside of the United States, or
the proceeds of insider trading are hidden in offshore bank
accounts."6 Further, inefficiencies likely would result from a
multiplicity of state rules governing trading in a national market."
Professor Karmel faults O'Hagan because the Court "did not
offer any theoretical justification for banning insider trading or
endorsing the misappropriation theory other than that it insures
honest securities markets and promotes investor confidence."' "°8
Karmel contends that because O'Hagan "did not develop a broad
doctrine or policy rationale," lower courts will have difficulty in
"distinguishing between lawful and unlawful outsider trading."'0 9
In an attempt to clarify the scope of the insider trading prohibition,
Karmel proposes that "the ban on insider trading be related to the
disclosure obligations of issuers, bidders, and other market
participants as a means to enforce those obligations and accelerate
the release of material information." 110
It seems to me that "insuring honest securities markets" and
"promoting investor confidence" are broad policy rationales. In
any event, Karmel's view that insider trading regulation should be
limited to "enforc[ing] the disclosure obligations of securities
note 8, at 169. This is an idea that probably sounds better in theory than it would
work in practice.
106. See DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING REGULATION,
ENFORCEMENT AND PREVENTION 14:1 (2002) ("Some of the most notorious
insider trading cases that have been prosecuted in the United States... have
involved substantial offshore activity.").
.107. Ribstein acknowledges the potential problem of lack of uniformity, but
dismisses it on several grounds: "as long as the law of the incorporating state
determines the rights of a corporation and their insiders to corporate
information, the stock price could reflect data about the applicable law. See
Ribstein, supra note 8, at 159. If uniformity is efficient, moreover, data suggest"
that states would move towards a uniform rule. See Bainbridge, supra note 8, at
1626 (arguing that "if the policy justification for regulation of insider trading is
protection of the property rights of the source of the information, however, there
is no justification for developing a uniform federal standard.").
108. Karmel, supra note 8, at 94.
109. Id. at 123 ("[W]hether a family or other non-fiduciary personal
relationship will suffice for liability under O'Hagan remains to be seen.").
110. Id. at 113.
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markets participants""' is too narrow. Persons or entities that are
not market participants may obtain non-public information by
breaching a duty and trading securities to profit (or avoid a loss).
The source of the information, if a market participant, has not
violated its disclosure obligations, yet probably will be harmed to
some extent. Information useful for insider trading-that a security
is either undervalued or overvalued because the market lacks
certain information-will lose some of its value when the
information is used for trading if such trading affects the price of
the stock. Although whether this will occur is controversial, 112
there are other possible harms to the principal. For example, the
principal may be harmed if it is a law firm or financial printer,
whose ability to keep information secret has value in itself,
independent of any market impact resulting from use of the
information. Further, others trading in the market may be harmed
as well.'13
Moreover, there is no evidence yet of widespread confusion in
the lower courts in dealing with issues arguably left open, or called
into question, by O'Hagan. For example, in United States v.
Falcone,"' the defendants argued that O'Hagan cast doubt on the
Court of Appeals' prior holding in Libera,"1 ' a pre-O'Hagan case,
that someone who informs others of information, but does not
himself trade on that information, commits fraud "in connection
with" the purchase or sale of a security and therefore violates
section 10(b). The court had little difficulty in rejecting this
argument:
111. Id. at 124.
112. Compare Lee, supra note 104, at 164 (persons who base trades on price
signals are "harmed by insider trading because they may be misled by the price
movements caused by insiders' trades into perceiving that the securities are
misvalued."), with William J. Carney, Signaling and Causation in Insider Trading,
36 CATH. L. REv. 863, 888 (1987) ("[I]nsider trading generally provides only
weak signals to traders.").
113. See William K.S. Wang, Stock Market Insider Trading Victims, Violators
and Remedies-Including an Analogy to Fraud in the Sale of Used Car With a
Generic Defect, 45 VILL L. REv. 27, 29 (2000) ("[E]ach act of stock market
trading has specific victims.").
114. United States v. Falcone, 57 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2001)
115. See United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1993).
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The Supreme Court in O'Hagan did not purport to set forth the
sole combination of factors necessary to establish the requisite
connection in all contexts. Accordingly, this Circuit after
O'Hagan has applied the misappropriation theory to schemes
involving nontrading tippers, albeit without discussion of the
"in connection with" requirement.1 6 Application of Libera to
the instant case is therefore not undermined by the lack of a
trading tipper here, notwithstanding the intervening decision in
O'Hagan. 1
7
Other post-O'Hagan cases in the courts of appeals, for
example Larrabee " and Sargent,"9 do not reflect confusion in
applying the misappropriation theory.
However, one recent District Court decision goes astray as to
the proper reach of the misappropriation theory. In United States
v. Kim,"' the government alleged that Defendant Kim belonged to
the Young Presidents Organization, an organization of CEOs that
required members, as a condition of membership, to agree to keep
information obtained through the club confidential. 2 ' One of the
club members, whose company was involved in merger
negotiations, could not attend the club's mandatory annual
meeting. 1" He told the retreat moderator the reason for his
116. See Falcone, 257 F.3d at 233 (citing United States v. McDermott, 245 F.3d
133 (2d Cir. 2001) and applying the theory to hold that sufficient evidence
supported insider trading conviction of non-trading tipper-the president, CEO
and chairman of an investment bank specializing in mergers and acquisitions-
who gave material, non-public information for trading purposes to a woman with
whom he was having an affair).
117. See id. The court went on to hold that:
O'Hagan's requirement that the misappropriated information "ordinarily" be
valuable due to "its utility in securities trading," O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 657,
appears to be a more generally applicable factor in determining whether section
10(b)'s "in connection with" requirement is satisfied. That requirement is met
in a case where, as here, the misappropriated information is a magazine column
that has a known effect on the prices of the securities of the companies it
discusses.
Falcone, 257 F.3d at 233-34.
118. United States v. Larrabee, 240 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2001).
119. SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2000).
120. United States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
121. Id. at 1008.
122. Id.
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absence, and the moderator informed Kim.'23 Kim traded in the
company's stock based on this information and tipped others who
also traded.24
The district court dismissed insider trading charges brought
against Kim because it concluded, as a matter of law, that Kim did
not owe any fiduciary or similar duty to the other club members.'25
The court reasoned that a fiduciary or functionally equivalent
relationship requires that some measure of "superiority,
dominance, or control" on the part of the fiduciary over the other
party to the relationship.26 The court held that the relationship
between the club members was "best characterized as an equal
relationship between peers" rather than "a relationship involving a
degree of dominance. ' ' "V The court also rejected the government's
contention that the explicit confidentiality agreement gave rise to a
fiduciary-type relationship, concluding that the agreement "may
memorialize a moral and ethical duty that members undertake, but
it does not create a legal one."'"
The court's reasoning is not persuasive. The "duty" issue in
misappropriation cases turns on whether the misappropriator
obtained access to confidential information by exploiting the
information source's reasonable expectation that information
would be kept in confidence. The Second Circuit in United States
v. Chestman stated that such reliance is justifiable in relationships
which are "inherently fiduciary" (e.g., attorney-client, doctor-
patient, employer-employee).'29  These relationships do not
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1008-09.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1011.
127. Id. at 1013.
128. Id. at 1013.
129. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991). Since
O'Hagan did not address the issue of what types of personal relationships suffice
to establish a duty for purposes of the misappropriation theory, the leading case
on this issue remains Chestman. Chestman held that there was insufficient
evidence to establish criminal liability based on disclosures between spouses,
where there was no express agreement to keep the information confidential nor a
past pattern or practice of keeping business information secret. See Chestman,
947 F.2d at 567-68.
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necessarily involve unequal parties. Further, although the district
court claimed to be following Chestman,"3' the court's holding is
contrary to Chestman's recognition that an "express agreement of
confidentiality" could "itself establish fiduciary status.'' 3.
The district court's decision cannot be "blamed" (assuming
one agrees it is incorrect) on anything the Supreme Court said in
O'Hagan, although it does illustrate that O'Hagan could usefully
have provided more guidance as to the type of duties sufficient to
establish liability under the misappropriation theory. However,
there is not yet widespread confusion over applying the
misappropriation theory after O'Hagan.
Painter, Krawiec, and Williams launch an attack on O'Hagan's
rationale from a different perspective. They argue that "a
conceptual dilemma stems from the misappropriation theory's
failure to address two characteristics" of information "which
distinguish it from most other forms of property."'32 First, "because
information is intangible, it is difficult to protect from discovery by
others unless the possessor keeps the information to herself,
sharing it with no one"; second, "information is a public good.
Like many public goods, its use by one or more persons does not
reduce the amount remaining for use by others."'33  They fault
O'Hagan because the Court "treats information as tangible and
finite.""'
Both points seem unpersuasive to me. The fact that insider
trading is often successful-that is, persons make a profit trading
securities based on an informational advantage with respect to
others in the market-even though information about proposed
corporate transactions almost always will be known by more than
130. See Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 1110-12.
131. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 571; see also SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 75 (1st
Cir. 2000) ("In the context of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability premised on
the misappropriation theory, the existence of a fiduciary relationship turns on
whether the source of the misappropriated information granted the
misappropriator access to the confidential information in reliance on a promise
by the misappropriator that the information would be safeguarded.").
132. Painter et al., supra note 8, at 182.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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one person, indicates that information often is shared within a
limited group and protected. Second, the use of material non-
public information may reduce its value, since it is at least possible
that unauthorized trading by someone having material non-public
information about a company may signal the market and affect the
company's stock price, thereby diminishing the future value of the
information."
3. O'Hagan's "Unanswered Questions"
Although O'Hagan does not provide answers to all of the
questions posed by its critics, or even by its supporters,"6
O'Hagan's critics overstate the extent and importance of these
unanswered questions. The main "unanswered question"
commentators point to is the Supreme Court's failure to specify
what types of relationships suffice to establish the duty required by
the misappropriation theory.'7 O'Hagan presented easy facts on
135. See supra notes 111, 112; see also Stephanie F. Barkholz, Comment,
Insider Trading, the Contemporaneous Trader, and the Corporate Acquirer:
Entitlement to Profits Disgorged By the SEC, 40 EMORY L.J. 537, 559 (1991)
("Studies of takeovers also show that when information is released before the
takeover occurs (as in insider trading), the acquirer pays a higher price."); Litton
Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 967 F.2d 742, 745 (2d Cir. 1992)
(stating that factual issues exist as to whether insider trading in target company
stock caused price to rise and therefore injured bidder). But see Lynn A. Stout,
Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and
Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1277-78 (1990) (finding that it seems unlikely
that "investors can decode much information from transactions that may, or may
not, be illegal insider trading."); LANGEVOORT, supra note 106, at 1:3 ("[T]here is
no reason to believe that insider trading will automatically move the market price
in any significant fashion. That will occur only where other marketplace
participants can "decode" the trading as involving an insider with a significant
informational advantage.").
136. See, e.g., Pritchard, supra note 7, at 43-46 (discussing "puzzles in the
Misappropriation Theory").
137. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 1634 ("Does a duty to disclose to
the information's source arise before trading in all fiduciary relationships?");
Painter et al., supra note 8, at 191 ("Unfortunately, the scope of fiduciary duties,
particularly outside the traditional corporate insider context, is far from clear.");
Swanson, supra note 6, at 1209 ("[T]he Court did not explain the scope of
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this issue. A lawyer owes well-recognized duties to his or her
client.138 Similarly, no difficulties are presented with respect to
cases involving other employer-employee relationships.
39
Uncertainty may exist, however, with respect, to which personal
relationships create a duty of confidentiality."
This criticism of O'Hagan has some force, as illustrated by the
Kim decision. However, any uncertainty that exists likely will
affect only a relatively small number of cases.'4' Moreover, new
Commission Rule 10b-5(2) reduces further any potential
uncertainty. The rule identifies three situations involving personal
relationships in which a duty exists to keep information
confidential, for purposes of the misappropriation theory: an
express agreement, prior conduct from which an agreement can be
inferred, and sharing of information among family members
(subject to certain defenses).'42
Painter, Krawiec, and Williams assert, as an example of the
fiduciary relationships or the nature of the applicable law.").
138. See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F. 2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991).
139. See, e.g., SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990).
140. See Grzebielski, supra note 32, at 488 ("[T]he unsettled question is
whether a personal or family relationship can provide a basis for Rule 10b-5
violations.").
141. See John J. Falvey, Jr., The New SEC Rules on Insider Trading: The
Criminal Implications, 13 SEc. LITIG. AND REG. REP. 14 (2001) ("O'Hagan, like
most misappropriation cases, involved a confidential business relationship .....
142. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2000). A duty exists:
(1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence;
(2) Whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic information
and the person to whom it is communicated have a history, pattern, or practice
of sharing confidences, such that the recipient of the information knows or
reasonably should know that the person communicating the material nonpublic
information expects that the recipient will maintain its confidentiality; or
(3) Whenever a person receives or obtains material nonpublic information from
his or her spouse, parent, child, or sibling; provided, however, that the person
receiving or obtaining the information may demonstrate that no duty of trust or
confidence existed with respect to the information, by establishing that he or
she neither knew nor reasonably should have known that the person who was
the source of the information expected that the person would keep the
information confidential, because of the parties' history, pattern, or practice of
sharing and maintaining confidences, and because there was no agreement or
understanding to maintain the confidentiality of the information.
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"uncertain duties" facing even an attorney possessing confidential
information, that "if O'Hagan, instead of trading, had become
drunk at a bar and had then, without expecting anything in return
for his loose lips, breached his duty to Grand Met by talking about
the impending takeover of Pillsbury with a group of lawyers, all of
whom trade on the information, nobody-neither O'Hagan nor the
other lawyers who traded-would be liable under section 10(b)." '143
This greatly understates the risk to anyone who traded
securities in such circumstances. The SEC has taken the position
that, in a misappropriation case, a person who tips others with
material non-public information need not obtain any personal
benefit to be liable.'" If, in their hypothetical, O'Hagan acted
recklessly, he could face prosecution for breaching a duty to the
source of the information, whether or not he got anything in
return. Further, if the tippees in this hypothetical knew or should
have known that O'Hagan was breaching a duty, they could also be
liable. Painter, Krawiec, and Williams mistakenly invoke the
district court's decision in SEC v. Switzer to support their
analysis.' 5 Switzer involved trading (and tipping) by defendant
Switzer after overhearing a conversation between a corporate
insider and his spouse. The Switzer court determined that the
tipper-the corporate insider-was not aware of anyone who
might overhear his conversation, and therefore was not reckless. 146
Since tippee liability is derivative of tipper liability, this finding
meant that the tippee, Switzer, escaped liability.' Switzer does not
143. Painter et al., supra note 8, at 194.
144. See Brief for the SEC at 40-46, SEC v. Yun (11th Cir. 2001) (No. 01-
14490HH). In contrast, the Supreme Court held in Dirks that, in a case brought
under the classical theory, someone who tips is not liable under section 10(b)
unless he or she obtains a personal benefit from the tip. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S.
646, 662 (1983).
145. Painter et al., supra note 8, at 194 n.164 (citing SEC v. Switzer, 590 F.
Supp 756 (W.D. Okla 1984)).
146. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. at 762.
147. Id. at 765-66. Liability for insider trading, like liability for any violation
of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, requires scienter-the intent to manipulate,
deceive, or defraud-which includes reckless conduct, but not negligence. See
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976) (requiring scienter);
Allan Horwich, The Neglected Relationship of Materiality and Recklessness in
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stand for the proposition that there can never be liability for an
overheard conversation.
Ribstein provides a catalogue of O'Hagan's "unanswered
questions, '  and at times appears to be stretching to find
uncertainties in the Court's decision. For example, Ribstein states
that "the Court left unclear whether O'Hagan had to disclose both
to his firm and the client."'' 9 However, the Court stated that where
a person trading securities "owes duties of loyalty to two entities or
persons-for example, a law firm and its client- but makes
disclosure to only one, the trader may still be liable under the
misappropriation theory."'50  Ribstein also asks, "Must the
misappropriation involve a market participant? The Court
suggested that it did but did not clearly so hold."'5 ' Ribstein's
support for this contention is that the Supreme Court quoted an
article by Aldave "describing Carpenter [v. United States] as
involving fraud on a non-market participant."'' 2 However, nothing
in the Court's quotation of Aldave suggests that the Court
intended this comment to limit the scope of the misappropriation
theory.'5'
Actions Under Rule lOb-5, 55 Bus. L. 1023, 1024 (2000) ("Virtually every court
that has considered the question has held that scienter includes recklessness.").
148. Ribstein, supra note 8, at 136-39.
149. See id. at 136.
150. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 665 n.7 (1997).
151. Ribstein, supra note 8, at 137.
152. Id. at 137 n.63 (citing Barbara Aldave, Misappropriation, A General
Theory of Liability for Trading on Non Public Information, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv.
101 (1984)).
153. The Court was simply describing its prior decisions by noting that:
Twice before we have been presented with the question whether criminal
liability for violation of section 10(b) may be based on a misappropriation
theory. In Chiarella ... the jury had received no misappropriation theory
instructions, so we declined to address the question. In Carpenter v. United
States,... the Court divided evenly on whether, under the circumstances of that
case, convictions resting on the misappropriation theory should be affirmed.
Barbara Aldave, The Misappropriation Theory: Carpenter and Its Aftermath, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 373, 375 (1988) (observing that "Carpenter was, by any reckoning,
an unusual case," for the information there misappropriated belonged not to a
company preparing to engage in securities transactions, e.g., a bidder in a
corporate acquisition, but to the Wall Street Journal).
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4. Loopholes in the Regulatory Scheme
A number of critics argue that O'Hagan creates gaps in the
coverage of the federal securities laws governing insider trading.
Some use this criticism as a further basis to challenge the
correctness or coherence of the decision; others argue that the
Court reached the correct result in O'Hagan, but did not extend
the law far enough.
Professor Nagy criticizes O'Hagan for not reaching the
conduct of "the brazen fiduciary"- "fiduciaries who disclose to
their principals the fact that they intend to use confidential
information in a subsequent securities transaction."'"' Similarly,
Karmel points out that "the Court stated that if a fiduciary
discloses to his source his plans to trade on nonpublic information,
there is no deception and, therefore, no Rule 10b-5 violation."'55
Karmel argues that "this is the weakest part of the Court's opinion
simply because it fails to tie the ban against insider trading to the
overarching disclosure policies of the securities laws that mandate
disclosure to public investors."'5 6  A related criticism is that
O'Hagan creates another loophole by allowing authorized
trading-trading where the source of information explicitly
consents to the use of the information by a person owing a duty to
the source. Painter, Krawiec, and Williams consider it a "startling
concession" that "the O'Hagan decision permits a fiduciary to
trade on material non-public information with the consent of the
principal."157
I agree that a gap exists in the reach of the misappropriation
theory. Assuming one accepts that insider trading causes harm to
market efficiency or capital formation, this harm exists whether or
not non-public information is obtained by deception. However,
this gap in the theory's coverage is compelled by section 10(b)'s
deception requirement. Deception cannot exist if there is full
154. Nagy, supra note 8, at 1256-58
155. Karmel, supra note 8, at 95.
156. Id.; see also Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 1649 (arguing that allowing
trading if there is disclosure to the source is inconsistent with both investor
protection rationale and property rights).
157. Painter et al., supra note 8, at 179.
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disclosure by the misappropriator or consent by the source or
owner of the information. This gap, however, probably has little
practical significance in the corporate setting. The "brazen
fiduciary" likely would be fired immediately, and the source or
owner of the information could also seek an injunction to prohibit
use of the information. Nor does the consent scenario seem likely
to occur. Bainbridge asserts that "Suppose, for example, a
takeover bidder authorized an arbitrageur to trade in the target
company's stock on the basis of material nonpublic
information... ." With respect to liability under 10b-5, O'Hagan
"at least implicitly validated authorized trading of this sort."'58
There would, however, in the tender offer context, still be potential
liability under Rule 14e-3.
On the other hand, O'Hagan has been criticized on the ground
that, although it reached the correct result on the facts, the Court
failed to go far enough in protecting investors. Nagy posits that,
with respect to a number of scenarios, the decision is too
restrictive.'59 For example, Nagy argues that, under O'Hagan, the
"non-fiduciary thief" would escape liability."W Nagy asserts that
O'Hagan would allow the computer hacker "who unlawfully gains
access to a corporation's internal network and subsequently
manages to uncover confidential information" that is "sure to send
its stock price soaring" to trade without any potential insider
trading liability, assuming that the hacker has "no pre-existing
relationship with the corporation.' 6.
Although a "non-fiduciary thief" may be beyond the scope of
the section 10(b) insider trading prohibition, Nagy's hypothetical
does not admit of a simple answer. Computer hackers, even if they
had no pre-existing relationship to a company, may be engaging in
deception if they pretend to be someone else in order to gain
access to non-public information. That is, suppose a hacker gains
access by using a password that the hacker is not authorized to
possess. The hacker could be viewed as impersonating the rightful
158. Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 1634.
159. Nagy, supra note 8, at 1252-59.
160. Id. at 1252.
161. Id. at 1253.
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possessor of the password, and therefore engaging in deception.
On the other hand, it might be argued that this conduct is more
akin to stealing the key to someone's locked file, in order to get
information. That conduct, in itself; is not deceptive. Perhaps the
analogy should be to getting several thousand keys made, and
trying each in the door of a locked office until access is obtained.
But that, again, would not be deceptive.
Nagy is mistaken, however, in arguing that "even if the thief
had been a former employee of the company, rather than a
stranger," the thief's conduct would not constitute deception
because "the former employee would have been a 'non-fiduciary'
both at the time he stole the information and at the time he used
the information." '162 First, if the "mere thief" is an impostor, as
discussed above, the thief engages in deception, whether or not the
thief owes a duty to anyone. Second, a former employee owes
common law duties to his or her former employer not to steal
information obtained during the course of employment.'
5. The Decision Reaches Too Far
Many commentators argue that O'Hagan reaches too far.
Professor Prakash, for example, argues that O'Hagan
"underscores" the "astonishingly dysfunctional nature" of the
federal insider trading regime.'64 Prakash contends that, under the
misappropriation theory, "liability should result any time a
securities trade deceptively breaches a duty."'65  He asks us to
"consider a state government employee who knowingly and
secretly violates her state's policy against using government
property for personal use by making a securities trade with a
162. Id. at 1253-54.
163. See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 411 (7th Cir. 1991). As Nagy points out,
breaking into a locked corporate office and stealing information is burglary, but
not fraud. See Nagy, supra note 8, at 1254. This conduct is not actionable under
the misappropriation theory, but, it "very rarely" arises that "someone trades on
the basis of material information that he has stolen from a person to whom the
trader owes no fiduciary duty." Weiss, supra note 7, at 438.
164. Prakash, supra note 8, at 1491.
165. Id. at 1496.
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government computer. O'Hagan perversely suggests" that this
conduct violates Rule 10b-5.'" According to Prakash, the Supreme
Court "unintentionally endorsed a broader theory of liability that
completely eclipses the misappropriation theory. Although
O'Hagan involved material, nonpublic information, O'Hagan's
reasoning demonstrates that the presence of such information was
irrelevant. ,
167
If this were the law after O'Hagan, the wisdom of the decision
would be questionable. However, nothing in O'Hagan suggests
that materiality is no longer relevant.' Although the Court did
not discuss the issue of materiality, it did describe the
misappropriation theory as involving trading based on "material,
non-public information.' ' 169  O'Hagan provides no basis for
concluding that the Supreme Court intended to implicitly abolish
this well-established element of liability under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5. 7°
Professors Kerr and Sweeney argue that O'Hagan's "test for
liability is too broad," because "virtually any relationship can be a
basis for liability." They argue that "individuals with no
connection or duty to the companies in which they trade are not
the corporate insiders Congress intended to target with section
10(b).' 17' Kerr and Sweeney do not make a convincing case for this
limited reading of Congressional intent with respect to section
10(b). Indeed, they acknowledge that "the purpose of the
securities laws is to protect the integrity of the market.' '7 2 Why
isn't integrity of the market compromised by trading on secret
information, even if the source of the information is not a
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1532.
168. Material information is information that a reasonable investor would
likely consider important. See Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 (1988).
169. See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647, 656 (1997).
170. See, e.g., SEC v. Research Automation Corp., 585 F.2d 31, 35 n.8 (2d Cir.
1978) ("One element of a securities fraud action is the materiality of the
misleading factual statement or omission.").
171. Kerr & Sweeney, supra note 8, at 82.
172. Id. at 55.
2003] MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY AND O'HAGAN 897
corporate insider?... Moreover, although corporate insiders
trading on information may have been the focus of Congress when
it enacted the securities laws, to the extent it considered the issue,
nothing in the statute or legislative history demonstrates that
Congress would have intended to limit the reach of federal law
enforcement to such persons.7 '
Several critics argue that the potentially broad reach of
O'Hagan creates issues of fair notice.17 This is not a problem on
the facts of O'Hagan. O'Hagan owed well-established duties to his
client and to his employer, and, at the time of his trades (in August
and September 1988), the misappropriation theory had been
adopted by Second Circuit. Thus, "the statute, either standing
alone or as construed, made it reasonably clear at the relevant time
that the defendant's conduct was criminal.'
76
What about the question of notice going forward, especially in
cases not necessarily involving obvious duties such as those existing
between lawyers and clients or employees and employers? The
Supreme Court, in my view, did give a sufficient answer to this,
stating:
173. See supra note 102.
174. See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act, 42 STANFORD L. REv. 386 (1990) (stating that Congress, in
enacting section 10(b), intended to confer "open-ended rulemaking authority on
the SEC.").
175. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 1644 n.242 ("The uncertainty
created as to Rule 10b-5's parameters fairly raises vagueness and related due
process issues, despite the majority's rather glib dismissal of such concerns.");
Dessent, supra note 8, at 1192 ("[T]o the extent that the pro-prosecutorial
language of the majority can be read as encouraging the SEC to fashion new
theories of criminal culpability without federal legislation, the court raises...
issues of fair notice of criminal sanctions.").
176. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 267 (1997). Dessent's assertion
that "O'Hagan surely believed that he was complying with the Dirks and
Chiarella rationale when he traded on the information he attained regarding
Grand Met's desire to take over Pillsbury" is not plausible, and even if true, is
irrelevant. Dessent, supra note 8, at 1202. O'Hagan, as an experienced securities
lawyer, must have known that the Second Circuit had held that section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 prohibit misappropriating information from a bidder and trading
securities of a target company.
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To establish a criminal violation of Rule 10b-5, the Government
must prove that a person "willfully" violated the
provision .... Furthermore, a defendant may not be imprisoned
for violating Rule 10b-5 if he proves that he had no knowledge
of the Rule. O'Hagan's charge that the misappropriation theory
is too indefinite to permit the imposition of criminal
liability ... thus fails not only because the theory is limited to
those who breach a recognized duty. In addition, the statute's
"requirement of the presence of culpable intent as a necessary
element of the offense does much to destroy any force in the
argument that application of the [statute]" in circumstances
such as O'Hagan's is unjust.177
In addition, the issue of when personal relationships create a
duty for purposes of the misappropriation theory has now been
addressed by Rule 10b-5(2). Although the Rule has been
criticized,178 it does provide notice of conduct that may expose
persons to criminal prosecution.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in O'Hagan correctly resolved an
important issue as to the scope of the insider trading prohibition
under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. The
disparaging view of O'Hagan advanced by most of the
commentators is not warranted. Although commentators have
identified some uncertainties as to the scope of the O'Hagan
decision, as well as an arguable lack of depth in some parts of the
Court's analysis, they have not undermined the central points of
O'Hagan's legal analysis and policy rationale. Based on my survey
of the literature, I think that commentators, taken as a whole,
would give the Supreme Court a grade of D, at best. I would give
the Court an A-.
177. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 666 (1997) (footnotes and
citations omitted); see also, e.g., SEC v. Willis, 777 F. Supp 1165, 1173 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (rejecting "lack of notice" defense in a case involving a psychiatrist's
misappropriation of confidential information disclosed to him by a patient).
178. See Bach Hang, Note, The SEC's Criminal Rulemaking in Rule 10b5-2:
Incarceration Should Be Made of Sterner Stuff, 41 WASHBURN L. J. 629 (2002).
